Good regulations, bad regulation : a Peruvian port case by Defilippi, Enzo
1 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTO DE DISCUSIÓN 
 
DD/12/06 
 
 
Good regulations, bad regulation: a 
Peruvian port case 
 
Enzo Defilippi, PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
 
© 2012 Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico  DD/12/06 
 
Documento de Discusión 
 
Good regulations, bad regulation: a Peruvian port case 
 
By Enzo Defilippi, PhD 
August 2012 
 
Abstract 
 
Lead poisoning of Callao’s population is the most severe externality port operations cause in 
Peru. The problem could have been tackled in 2009, after the government issued a decree 
regulating how mineral ore was to be handled at Peruvian ports. However, the port regulator’s 
inability to follow the criteria contained in their own regulations led the procedure of selecting 
the providers of the service to continuous delays, and finally, to a complete stop. As a 
consequence, Callao’s population will continue to be affected by this externality until 2013. The 
problem the regulator could not solve was to determine whether the market for ‘mineral ore 
stevedore services’ at Callao Port was monopolistic or competitive. This article re-examines the 
case and concludes that the market for the service has natural monopoly characteristics. 
Therefore, the regulator should have ordered the call of an auction to select the least-expensive 
provider and thus, spare the population from four more years of lead poisoning. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The most severe externality port operations cause in Peru is the lead poisoning of the people 
living in the vicinity of Callao Port, the most important of the country. The consequences of this 
problem could have been substantially reduced in 2009, after the government issued a decree 
stating that mineral ore could only be handled at Peruvian ports using hermetic ship loaders, a 
kind of equipment that avoids pollution by encapsulating the ore when it is loaded onto the 
vessel. Unfortunately, the port regulator was not able to determine the right procedure to select 
the firms that could provide the service using this equipment. Consequently, mineral ore will 
continue contaminating Callao’s population at least until 2013, when a new dedicated terminal is 
expected to start operations. 
 
The main objective of this article is to show that this delay was unnecessary. If OSITRAN had 
followed its own regulations, the hermetic ship loaders could have been put in place by mid-
2009, as initially planned. A second objective is to highlight the fact that having a competent 
regulator is as necessary for an efficient port system as having sound regulations. This issue is 
especially relevant in Latin American countries, where public policies typically focus in the 
creation, not in the enforcement, of new regulations. A third objective is to show that regulatory 
inaction may have worse consequences over welfare than the inefficiency regulators are meant to 
avoid. 
 
The remaining of the document is structured as following: the next section describes the 
problem in detail. The third section explains the theory of how the problem of determining the 
optimum number of operators had to be settled. In the fourth section, two analyses are 
performed to determine whether the mineral ore loading services’ cost function at Callao port is 
sub-additive or not. The fifth and final section presents the conclusions. 
 
2. THE PROBLEM 
2.1 Lead contamination at Callao port 
Callao is Peru´s main port. It is Lima’s natural gateway, the country’s economic engine that 
generates over a third of its GDP. In 2008, the port handled 19 million MT; including 1.2 million 
TEU (90% of Peru’s containerized traffic). An additional reason to consider this port as a 
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strategic asset for the Peruvian economy is that mining exports account for 60% of the country’s 
total and Callao handles 70% of the total exported through Peru’s common user ports [1]. 
 
Despite its importance for the local economy, by 2009 the port did not have the necessary 
equipment to avoid cargoes polluting water and soil. Mineral ore (mostly zinc and lead) was still 
carried by dumper trucks, piled up in the quay and was loaded onto vessels using uncovered 
conveyor belts and ship loaders, therefore allowing the ore to pollute air and water. The service 
was provided by private stevedores firms. Empresa Nacional de Puertos (ENAPU), the state-
owned company that managed the terminal, did not participate in this market. 
 
The result of this situation was a large-scale social problem. Several studies show that blood-lead 
levels of people living in areas surrounding Callao port are alarming. A study carried out in 1999, 
for example, found that blood-lead levels of children attending schools located close to the port 
or near-by warehouses contained 25.6 ug/dL of lead, in average; a level substantially higher than 
the one found in other areas of the Callao Province (9.5 ug/dL) or Lima (7.1 ug/dL) [2]. The 
highest level recommended by the World Health Organization is 10 ug/dL. According to the 
organization, lead is especially harmful for children because it interferes with their normal 
development. A 10ug/dL increase diminishes, in average, IQ by 2.5 points and growth by 1 cm. 
 
The problem was ignored by successive administrations. Only in 2008, the Peruvian government 
issued the 015-2008-MTC Decree, which stated that hermetic ship loaders will have to be used in 
all mineral ore stevedore operations by the end of 2009.  
 
2.2 The Access Regulation 
Peruvian ports are considered natural monopolies, for which prices and market access conditions 
are regulated by Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso 
Público (OSITRAN)1 OSITRAN’s access regime is aimed at fostering efficiency in Peruvian 
common user ports where terminals are natural monopolies, by encouraging competition in as 
many markets as possible. In markets where competition is feasible, the allowed number of 
suppliers as well as the procedure to select them is determined according to the criteria contained 
in the Access Regulation. When competition is not feasible, the regulator sets the prices directly. 
                                                          
 
1 In Callao Port, the market for containerized cargo cannot be considered a monopoly since May 2010, when a 
second container terminal, concessioned to DP World, started operations. 
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Stevedoring of bulk cargo is considered an ‘Essential Service’ and thus, covered by the Access 
Regulation. According to this regulation, firms who want to provide an Essential Service must 
request access to a (monopolistic) terminal operator, who can only deny it for justified reasons, 
such as operative, safety or security limitations. When the number of access seekers is higher 
than the number of feasible slots, the terminal operator must call a public auction, in which main 
access conditions (such as access charges or final prices) are set. Otherwise, the terminal operator 
can negotiate conditions directly with access seekers. The regulator only intervenes to arbitrate 
controversies or to mandate access when parties cannot reach an agreement [3].  
 
It is worth noting that the Access Regulation aims at increasing market efficiency by encouraging 
competition, not at solving problems created by negative externalities such as pollution. Dealing 
with environmental problems and other market failures requires policy tools of a different kind. 
However, since the Access Regulation requires participants in markets for Essential Services to 
comply with several types of standards, it is also an effective instrument to achieve 
environmental goals in monopolistic situations. Nevertheless, as one can see in this case, the 
efficacy of regulation largely depends on the efficacy of the regulator. 
 
2.3 The frustrated access procedure 
One month after the issuance of the 015-2008-MTC Decree, several firms showed their 
willingness to provide stevedore services according to the new environmental requirements. 
Given the private interest and the existence of a regulatory procedure that facilitates port 
investments, the service should have been provided under the new conditions by the end of 
2009. Unfortunately, a controversy arose between ENAPU and one private company 
(COSMOS) regarding the number of firms that could provide the service, i.e., whether ENAPU 
could engage in direct negotiations with access seekers or had to call a public auction.  
 
The sequence of the problem is the following: 
 
1. In May 2008, ENAPU published a notice asking interested firms to submit access requests to 
provide stevedore services for mineral ore at Callao port. Given space limitations, the equipment 
to be used had to be mobile. 
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2. In July 2008, ENAPU announced that two ship loaders could operate simultaneously at the 
quay and therefore, it would grant access to two firms to operate one loader each. In this way, it 
argued, final prices would be set through competition. The state-owned firm also announced that 
only two firms had presented access requests, for which it would negotiate access conditions 
directly with them. 
 
3. ENAPU’s decision to negotiate access conditions directly was appealed by COSMOS, one of 
the access seekers, to OSITRAN. According to COSMOS, since two ship loaders are always 
required for these operations, competition would never occur if access was granted to two firms. 
COSMOS also argued that since firms operating ship loaders are not regulated by OSITRAN 
(only terminal operators are subject to economic regulation); ENAPU’s decision would lead to 
an unregulated duopoly, thus harming port services’ users. Part of the rents would be transferred 
to ENAPU via higher-than-necessary access charges.  
 
4. In May 2009, OSITRAN upheld the appeal and ordered ENAPU to reinitiate the access 
procedure.  
 
5. In June 2009, ENAPU asked again interested parties to submit access requests, stating this 
time that it would grant access to three firms, each operating a mobile ship loader. Since the quay 
could only accommodate two loaders operating simultaneously, one of them had to remain each 
time in the parking area. Redundancy would lead to competition, since none of the firms would 
want its equipment to remain unused. 
 
6. In July 2009, ENAPU called a public auction to grant access to three firms to operate one 
mobile ship loader each. 
 
7. In August 2009, COSMOS challenged the auction rules before OSITRAN arguing that setting 
up three ship loaders when only two are needed would lead to unproductive investments and 
higher prices for final users. It also argued that the rules did not state what would occur if less 
than three bids qualified for the auction or one of the winning firms leaves the market, which 
would convert the market into an unregulated monopoly or duopoly. COSMOS’ position was 
that the most efficient arrangement was to call an auction to grant access to one firm to operate 
two ship loaders.  
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According to the Access Regulation, in these circumstances OSITRAN has to analyze the 
auction rules and issue an opinion taking into account the principle of efficiency, and if 
necessary, modify them. According to the principle of efficiency stated in the Regulation, access 
conditions have to avoid ‘inefficient duplicity, congestion costs and other externalities’ [4]. The 
legal term passed, however, without the regulator issuing an opinion on how the auction should 
proceed.  
 
According to Peru’s legal system, in a situation like this COSMOS could go to court to force 
OSITRAN to issue the opinion, but that did not occur either. Few weeks before legal term 
passed, a consortium of logistic operators and mining companies (two of them the future main 
users of the service) had presented the government a proposal to build a dedicated mineral ore 
terminal in a different area of the port. This terminal, capable of handling in a more efficient way 
all of the mineral ore expected to be extracted from Central Peru, was planned to start 
operations by 2012, which would have given mobile ship loader operators the minimum period 
of three years needed to recoup investments. However, OSITRAN, by delaying the access 
procedure, made it unprofitable to provide the service for which access was sought.  
 
As one can see, what caused the delay and eventual stall of the access procedure was the 
regulator’s inability to determine the number of suppliers that could provide the service and 
whether conditions should be set through negotiation or an auction. The regulator’s failure 
ultimately caused that the reduction of the effects of lead poisoning had to wait until late 20132, 
when it could have started as early as 2009. 
 
3. THE SOLUTION’S THEORY 
From an economic point of view, the solution to this problem consists on determining whether 
the market is competitive or naturally monopolistic. In the first case, the most efficient solution 
would be granting access to the highest possible number of firms. The final price would then be 
set through competition. In the second case, the most efficient solution would be granting access 
to just one provider.  
 
                                                          
 
2 This project also experienced delays, for which, by June 2012, operations are not expected to start before 
September 2013 [5]. 
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3.1 The natural monopoly case 
When the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics3 are met, free interaction of market 
forces leads to an efficient resource allocation without need of external intervention [6]. 
Otherwise, market failures occur.  
 
According to Tirole [7], there are three main sources of market failures: natural monopolies, 
externalities and information asymmetries. When any of them occur, external intervention is 
needed to correct their effects on prices and welfare levels. An industry is said to be a natural 
monopoly when technology imposes a cost function that makes it cheaper, for a relevant 
demand interval, to produce a good or service with only one firm in the market [8]. In general 
terms, this occurs when the minimum efficient scale of supply is higher than demand.  
 
The concept of natural monopoly was traditionally linked to the existence of economies of scale 
and scope. However, Baumol, Panzar and Willig [8] showed that the appropriate definition of 
natural monopoly lies on the concept of sub-additivity of costs.  
 
The concepts of economies of scale, economies of scope and sub-additivity of costs are formally 
defined below. 
 
Sub-additivity of costs 
Formally, a cost function ‘C’ associated to a production vector ‘Y’ is strictly sub-additive if the 
cost of producing Y by one firm is lower than the cost of producing the same vector by two or 
more firms using the same technology, for any sub-group ‘i’ of Y.  
 
Therefore, a cost function is sub-additive, if it satisfies the following condition for the relevant 
demand interval:  
 
 i iYCYC )()(  
 
Where: 
                                                          
 
3First Theorem of Welfare Economics: Under the following conditions, equilibrium in a set of competitive markets 
is Pareto-efficient: (i) there is no consumption externalities; and (ii), there are enough agents to ensure that each one 
behaves competitively.  
Second Theorem of Welfare Economics: If all agents have convex preferences, every efficient allocation is a 
competitive equilibrium for some initial allocation of goods [6].  
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An industry can be defined as a natural monopoly if the cost function is strictly sub-additive for 
the relevant demand interval [9].  
 
Economies of scale 
In the case of a multi-product firm, the definition of economies of scale is related to the concept 
of ‘decreasing average multi-product costs’. 
 
Decreasing average multi-product cost 
In the case of a firm producing ‘n’ goods, the concept of ‘average multi-product cost’ (AMPC) is 
defined as: 
 
Ya
YC
AMPC


)(
 
  
Where Y is the production vector, C is the cost function and a > 0 is a vector of relative weights. 
It can be said that AMPC is decreasing in Y if AMPC(tY) is a decreasing function of the scalar ‘t’ 
when t=1: 
 
 
 
In the case of a multi-product firm, economies of scale occur if AMPC is decreasing. 
 
Economies of scope 
Economies of scope exist in the production of a combination of goods, when the cost of 
producing such a combination by a single firm is lower than the cost of producing it by two or 
more firms that do not produce the same good. In the case of a multi-product firm, economies 
of scope refer to the existence of synergies in the production of two or more goods derived, for 
example, from the shared use of a production factor. This situation would allow a single firm to 
produce goods cheaper than firms not sharing production factors, even if economies of scale are 
not present. 
0
(tY) AMPC
1

tt

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In the case of a multi-product firm, the definition of economies of scale is related to the 
concepts of ´incremental cost of production’ and ‘average incremental cost’.  
 
Incremental cost of production ‘j’ 
The incremental cost (IC) of producing ‘j’ is the difference between producing a bundle of goods 
and producing the same bundle minus ‘j’, where Y-j is the production vector ‘Y’, but placing ‘0’ 
instead of ‘j’: 
 
)()()( jj YCYCYIC   
 
Average incremental cost  
The average incremental cost of ‘j’ is:  
 
 
In the presence of economies of scope, a firm’s cost function is sub-additive if for any good Yj 
belonging to the production vector Y, the average incremental cost is decreasing. 
 
As it can be seen, the concepts of sub-additivity of costs and natural monopoly are mutually 
implied [8]. 
 
3.2 The ‘Demsetz approach’  
According to Demsetz [10], an efficient alternative to regulate a natural monopoly is to franchise 
it to the bidder that in an auction offers to charge the lowest price to consumers. In the absence 
of collusion, with equal access to essential inputs and symmetric information among the bidders, 
an auction would induce prices to approach the average cost of the most efficient firm, thus 
minimizing simultaneously productive and allocative inefficiencies. This would also eliminate the 
need of a regulator setting prices, thus reducing the potential of regulatory failures and avoid 
incurring the costs of producing regulation. 
 
j
j
j
Y
YIC
AIC
)(

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4. NATURAL MONOPOLY OR COMPETITIVE MARKET? 
Two analyses can be made to determine whether the ‘mineral ore stevedores services’ cost 
function in the case of Callao is sub-additive: (i) a comparison between the demand and the 
minimum efficient scale of the market (the cost function is sub-additive if the former is smaller 
than the latter) and (ii) a comparison of the resulting prices in two scenarios: considering the 
market competitive and naturally monopolistic. A higher price in the former scenario would 
indicate unexhausted economies of scale or scope, i.e., cost sub-additivity.  
 
4.1 Comparison between the demand and the minimum efficient scale of supply 
Demand size 
As shown in figure 1, the volume of mineral ore handled in Callao port increased from 1.5 
million MT in 2000 to 2.27 million MT in 2008. Assuming an average annual growth rate of 
4.24%4, the port would handle a throughput of 2.8 million MT of mineral ore in 2013. 
 
Around 50% of this cargo is loaded onto 25 000 MT vessels. The remaining 50% is loaded onto 
ships ranging between 20 000 MT and 40 000 MT of capacity. The average batch size is 20 000 
MT [11]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Mineral ore exported through at Callao Port 2000- 2013 
                                                          
 
4 This figure was estimated averaging the average growth rates of the periods 2003-2008 (2.86%) and 2004-2008 
(5.63%). 
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Source: ENAPU [11] 
 
Minimum efficient scale 
According to ENAPU, given the dimensions of the quay used to load mineral ore at Callao Port 
and the size of the batches (around 20 000 MT each), this cargo can only be loaded efficiently 
using two ship loaders simultaneously. The quay is too narrow to use a third one and it is not 
economical using just one (the time the vessel would have to be at port would be excessive). This 
rationale was not disputed by OSITRAN, COSMOS or any of the other access seekers [12]. 
 
An engineering model was used to determine the terminal’s maximum loading capacity using 
standard equipment. It was supposed that two B&W standard ship loaders that comply with the 
015-2008-MTC Decree would be used. The terminal’s maximum loading capacity was 
determined as follows: 
 
1. According to the manufacturer specifications, these ship loaders are able to operate 252 days a 
year (6 048 hours).  
 
2. As shown in table 1, each ship loader’s average loading capacity is 514 MT per hour 
(supposing each is fed by two 30 MT dumper trucks simultaneously).  
 
Movement 
Minutes 
per truck 
Nr. Of 
trucks 
Maximum loading 
per truck 
Truck transfers to reception hopper 2 2 30 MT 
Positioning at the reception hopper 2 
  
Unloading 3 
  
Total 7 minutes 
  
Average hourly loading capacity per ship 
loader  
514 MT 
  
Table 1: Average hourly loading capacity per ship loader 
 
 
3. Assuming 20 000 MT batches, each would require approximately 20 hours to be loaded onto 
the vessel.  
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4. In addition, every time a vessel calls approximately four hours are required for mooring, 
unmooring, hatch opening and closing, among other activities. This implies the ship loaders can 
operate only 20 of every 24 berth-hours (5 040 hours a year), assuming 20 000 MT batches. 
 
5. As one can see, the total loading capacity of two ship loaders operating 5 040 hours a year, 
loading each 514 MT of mineral ore per hour, amounts to 5.18 million MT a year. This is the 
service’s minimum efficient scale.  
 
The fact that the 2008 demand represents only 43% of the minimum efficient scale and it was 
not expected to increase substantially in the near future, is a strong indicator that the service’s 
cost function is sub-additive. It implies that there will be unexhausted economies of scale or 
scope until demand approaches 5.18 MT a year.  
 
4.2 Comparison of resulting prices considering the market competitive and naturally 
monopolistic 
To perform this analysis, two scenarios were considered. In the first, it was assumed that the 
market is competitive. In the second one, it was assumed the market is naturally monopolistic. In 
both scenarios, income, costs, and investments were projected. Demand projections are those 
shown in Figure 1. An operation period of three years was supposed. 
 
Scenario 1: The market is competitive 
As seen before, each operation requires two ship loaders working simultaneously. For this 
reason, competition for this service can only occur if there are at least three mobile loaders in the 
market. In this case, each would be owned by a different firm. Since the quay could only 
accommodate two loaders operating simultaneously, one of them had to remain each time in the 
parking area. To simplify the analysis, it was assumed that each firm has a market share of 33.3%. 
 
The price of a ship loader with characteristics as those required by the 015-2008-MTC Decree is 
of US$ 2.73 million (including transport and setting up costs). Ancillary equipment would also be 
required. Total investments amount to US$ 2.80 million [12]. It has been assumed that each ship 
loader’s average loading capacity is 514 MT per hour. Each firm’s cost structure is shown in the 
appendix.  
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It has been assumed that 70% of the investment will be financed at 10% a year, and that the loan 
will be repaid in three years. If we assume an opportunity cost of capital of 15% a year and a tax 
rate of 30%, we obtain a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 9.4% 
 
Given these assumptions, if we believe the market for the service is competitive, the minimum 
price firms can charge to cover costs, investments and their shareholder’s opportunity cost is 
US$ 2.43 per MT. 
 
Scenario 2: The service is a natural monopoly 
In this scenario, it is assumed access is granted to only one firm that operates two ship loaders. 
The firm is selected in an open auction where the competition factor is the price charged to final 
users. Assumptions regarding demand, unit costs and investments are similar to those of the 
Scenario 1. In this scenario, however, one firm covers 100% of the demand.  
 
As a result, if we assume the market is a natural monopoly, the price that covers costs, 
investments and shareholder’s opportunity cost is US$ 1.59 per MT. 
 
Scenario comparison  
It can be seen that the price obtained assuming the service is a natural monopoly is 52% lower 
than assuming it is a competitive market. In these circumstances, considering the market 
competitive would have required users to pay extra costs for US$ 6.76 million5 during the three-
year period. 
 
These results also constitute a strong indicator that there are unexhausted economies of scale or 
scope for the relevant demand range. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
The results of the analysis carried out indicate that the market for ‘mineral ore stevedoring 
services’ at Callao port is a natural monopoly. Therefore, OSITRAN had to modify the rules of 
the auction called by ENAPU so that the access was granted to one firm to operate two ship 
                                                          
 
5 Obtained by multiplying the volume expected to be handled between 2011 and 2013 (8 million MT), times the 
price difference between scenarios (US$ 0.84 per MT). 
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loaders. Following Demsetz [10], in these circumstances the most efficient solution would have 
been turning the price charged to final users into the auction’s competition factor.  
 
The analysis also indicates that that the solution was at the regulator’s reach. To solve the 
problem, OSITRAN only had to follow the criteria and procedures contained in its own 
regulations. By not doing so, and therefore, delaying the access procedure, it discouraged the 
private sector to invest in a technology that would have reduced the effects of a problem as 
serious as lead poisoning four years earlier. As studies show, this externality, the most severe that 
port operations cause in Peru, has large and permanent effects over the population [2]. The 
outcome of this case constitutes evidence that regulatory inaction may have worse consequences 
over welfare than the inefficiency regulators are meant to avoid. 
 
Lastly, the case shows that an efficient port system does not only require regulations aimed at 
fostering economic efficiency, but also authorities with the knowledge and will necessary to 
tackle the complex problems port regulation poses.  
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7. APPENDIX: COST STRUCTURE IN BOTH SCENARIOS 
 
Scenario 1 
 Unit 2011 2012 2013 
Volume  MT/year 2 572 572 2 681 724 2 795 507 
Market share % 33% 33% 33% 
Cargo loaded TM/ year 848 949 884 969 922 517 
Average loading capacity TM/hour 514 514 514 
Ship loaders per firm und 1 1 1 
Labor costs     
Administrative US$/ year 306 841 306 841 306 841 
Operative (fixed) US$/ year 51 348 51 348 51 348 
Operative (variable) US$/shift 716 716 716 
Shifts Und 138 143 149 
Operative (variable) US$/ year 98 464 102 642 106 997 
Operative expenses     
Maintenance % investment 2% 2% 3% 
Maintenance US$ 55 979 55 979 83 969 
Fuel price US$/ Gallon 3.23 3.24 3.26 
Working hours hour 1 651 1 721 1 794 
Fuel Gallon 42 311 44 105 45 976 
Fuel consumption Gallons/ hour 26 26 26 
Fuel expenses US$/ year 136 487 142 985 149 795 
Insurance % income 7% 7% 7% 
General expenditures % expenses (w/o depr) 5% 5% 5% 
Access charges US$/ year 97 020 97 020 97 020 
Others     
Exchange rate (S/. per US$)  3.00 3.00 3.00 
VAT  19% 19% 19% 
Tax rate  30% 30% 30% 
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Scenario 2 
 Unit 2011 2012 2013 
Volume  MT/year 2 572 572 2 681 724 2 795 507 
Market share % 100% 100% 100% 
Cargo loaded TM/ year 1 286 286 1 340 862 1 397 754 
Average loading capacity TM/hour 514 514 514 
Ship loaders per firm und 2 2 2 
Labor costs     
Administrative US$/ year 306 841 306 841 306 841 
Operative (fixed) US$/ year 102 697 102 697 102 697 
Operative (variable) US$/shift 967 967 967 
Shifts Und 417 435 453 
Operative (variable) US$/ year 403 193 420 300 438 133 
Operative expenses     
Maintenance % investment 2% 2% 3% 
Maintenance US$ 111 958 111 958 167 937 
Fuel price US$/ Gallon 3.23 3.24 3.26 
Working hours hour 5 004 5 216 5 436 
Fuel Gallon 128 240 133 673 139 311 
Fuel consumption Gallons/ hour 26 26 26 
Fuel expenses US$/ year 413 676 433 358 453 894 
Insurance % income 2% 2% 2% 
General expenditures % expenses (w/o depr) 5% 5% 5% 
Access charges US$/ year 291 060 291 060 291 060 
Others     
Exchange rate (S/.per US$)  3.00 3.00 3.00 
VAT  19% 19% 19% 
Tax rate  30% 30% 30% 
 
 
 
